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I. Introduction 
 
The awesome capability to intervene at the beginning of human life through medicine--to actually 
enable the creation of life and choices about human characteristics--has burgeoned in recent years and 
continues to expand at an ever-quickening pace. [FN1] Assisted reproduction technology (ART) has 
become an increasingly accessible means for prospective parents to realize parenthood when 
confronting human health impediments--overcoming infertility, or avoiding an identifiable genetic risk 
or health impairment. Assisted reproduction (AR), which is carried out in the United States 
predominantly in hundreds of private, independent clinics, has become a vibrant, highly competitive 
business that markets itself aggressively and generates billions of dollars annually. [FN2] 
The revolution in human reproduction through AR (reproduction *550 revolution) is broadening 
parental choice about whether to have children and what genetic characteristics those children will or 
will not have. [FN3] This reproduction revolution and the genomics revolution, both ongoing and raging, 
are becoming intertwined through the use of AR technologies. [FN4] Colleagues have termed the nexus 
“reprogenetics.” [FN5] Professor John Robertson, a visionary immersed in the law and policy aspects of 
AR and genomics, has predicted our society's destiny in reprogenetics. As observed by Professor 
Robertson, “Ultimately, decisions about how to use or not use genomics in human reproduction will be 
determined, not by biologic necessity or evolutionary theory, but by how those uses fit into the fabric of 
rights and interests of individual and social choice and responsibility that particular societies recognize.” 
[FN6] 
The objective of this Article is to question the role of regulation in the field of AR at the present time and 
over the next several years as the genomics and AR revolutions continue to intensify and integrate. Part 
II discusses the extent to which AR is a distinguishable field of medicine, and does so from the often 
conflicting perspectives of patient, provider, and payer. Part III probes the United States' unique level of 
acceptance of AR among industrialized countries, attributable largely to a trilogy of deferences: to 
human reproduction, to the physician's discretion to practice medicine, and to physician-patient 
decision making. The Article concludes *551 that assurance of good medical practices and public 
accountability through regulation are at least as desirable in AR as in most other areas of medicine. 
Proposals for regulatory reform include a comprehensive, national licensing requirement for all AR 
services and the establishment of a federal overseeing authority. 
 
II. Distinguishing Features of AR as a Field of Medicine 
 
AR is generally performed as a medical clinical service, [FN7] and the Food and Drug Administration's 
jurisdiction historically has been checked not to interfere with physician discretion to practice medicine. 
[FN8] In fact, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (FCSRCA) [FN9] expressly 
provides: “In developing the certification program, the Secretary [of the Department of Health and 
Human Services] may not establish any regulation, standard, or requirement which has the effect of 
exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in assisted reproductive technology 
programs.” [FN10] Consequently, the United States' federal regulation consists almost entirely of self-
regulation through a program of voluntary reporting and certification. [FN11] The federal system rests 
largely upon the FCSRCA, pursuant to which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
developed a model certification program for AR laboratories. [FN12] The CDC has contractually 
outsourced implementation of its responsibilities *552 under the FCSRCA to the Society for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (SART) and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM). [FN13] 
Most AR providers belong to these organizations and report data to them voluntarily. SART-ASRM then 
collects, processes, and submits the data to the CDC, which in turn processes that data in a standard 
format and issues reports annually for public dissemination. [FN14] In addition to the CDC, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction to police marketing claims and has used that authority to 
investigate some AR providers. [FN15] Some states have done the same. [FN16] 
This author [FN17] and others, including Professor Lars Noah, [FN18] Erik Parens and Lori Knowles, 
[FN19] and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), [FN20] have questioned the sufficiency of this 
voluntary reporting, self-regulation system in the field of AR. [FN21] The FCSRCA did not even introduce 
a mandatory mechanism to report adverse events associated with fertility treatments, [FN22] and the 
CDC performs site visits on fewer than ten percent of AR clinics. [FN23] *553 Moreover, states “have 
failed to offer much direct regulation of fertility clinics.” [FN24] As summarized by the FDA: 
The model certification program for embryo laboratories developed by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) is a voluntary program that States may or may not choose to adopt; its primary 
focus is not on preventing the transmission of communicable disease. No State has yet adopted CDC's 
model certification program. Membership in professional societies is voluntary. Moreover, many 
establishments do not report to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology. [FN25] 
 
A. Existing AR Features 
Several features of AR support more direct government regulation by the United States. First, the three 
primary patient groups at issue--prospective parents, pregnant women, and the unborn--are 
exceptionally vulnerable, and two of these groups (pregnant women and the unborn) have been 
deemed as such under the Common Rule for the protection of human subjects. [FN26] Second, rapidly 
emerging technology, experimentation, and the practice of medicine are inherently mixed in AR--much 
more so than in most other fields of medicine. Novel techniques are often practiced in AR without the 
prerequisite of sufficient animal studies and human subjects protection oversight. [FN27] Examples 
include discovery and clinical use of *554 intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI); [FN28] cytoplasmic 
transfer; [FN29] in vitro ovum nuclear transplantation (IVONT); [FN30] and administering extraordinarily 
high doses of hormones to premenopausal women to impregnate them, even while physicians are being 
warned to administer only mild doses of estrogen to postmenopausal women, and just when most 
needed. [FN31] Nevertheless, the field of AR largely circumvents the United States' regulations to 
protect human subjects because the experimentation generally is deemed an extension of clinical 
service and is not carried out for product review and approval by the FDA. [FN32] “And since [new 
interventions in the field] are presented as innovative clinical practice rather than as research, oversight 
of *555 them is left to the discretion of the individuals or institutions offering them.” [FN33] 
A third feature necessitating more government regulation is that the majority of AR patients pay out-of-
pocket, which means that standard accountability and good medicine checks on clinical practice through 
third-party payer scrutiny generally do not pertain. [FN34] Fourth, commercial influences, including 
aggressive direct-to-consumer (DTC) marketing, are intense in AR and carried out regionally, nationally, 
and even internationally. [FN35] Much of the marketing data equates “success” with live births, 
regardless of whether those births are seriously premature or suffer serious health problems. [FN36] 
Fifth, a significant increase in multiple births, associated with premature delivery and health 
impairments, has already been attributed to AR services. [FN37] 
 
B. AR in the Future 
When considering the role of regulation in AR at the present time and over the next several years, the 
distinguishing features of AR must be thought through in the context of ongoing trends in biomedical 
research and development (R&D). These trends include the mission to make medical sense out of the 
map of the human genome; the extraordinary and ongoing commercial, governmental, and academic 
investment to accomplish that mission; and the voluminous and amassing power of bioinformatics. 
[FN38] The considerable genotype-phenotype connections (connections between genetic characteristics 
and physical/mental characteristics) being generated by the *556 “genomics revolution” must be taken 
into consideration. [FN39] Although the vast majority of these genotype-phenotype connections are 
subtle in the context of human health and even negligible for contemporary clinical health application, 
the capability to test for large numbers of them simultaneously is becoming remarkably easier. [FN40] 
As clusters of bits of information become larger, cheaper, and collectively more medically meaningful, 
presumably so will their appeal to patient-consumers. [FN41] 
Many predict that consumer-driven medicine is the emergent post-managed care era in United States 
medicine. [FN42] Certainly a reasonable amount of faith must be placed in the judgment of the patient-
consumer in the United States to make responsible decisions about the use of AR and health care in 
general. Nevertheless, medicine, and medical technology in particular, cannot be equated with standard 
commodities like groceries, clothes, and entertainment. [FN43] As explored fully in legal literature--
especially comparative health law literature--patients are not typical consumers, and health care is not a 
typical product or commodity. [FN44] Innovative medical *557 technologies that require more expertise 
to assess and are promoted through aggressive DTC marketing exacerbate these differences. A recent 
illustration is the patients' purchase of billions of dollars worth of prescription Vioxx and other Cox-2 
inhibitors through providers as an alternative to ibuprofen--a drug that was familiar and tested through 
use over time, available over the counter at a fraction of the cost, and now has been proven to be 
equally or even more effective for most patients and with significantly less risk. [FN45] 
When considering the role of regulation in the AR context, one must embrace the health care realities of 
patient and provider, and with sensitivity for the distinguishing features of the practice of AR addressed 
above. [FN46] In addition to the capacity to generate genetic information, the genomics revolution 
encompasses fields such as stem cell research and provides an understanding of cellular differentiation 
and genetic expression, resulting in immeasurable potential for human health application. [FN47] Given 
the distinguishing features of AR, AR providers will be at least as tempted and as likely as other 
physicians to apply emerging technology prematurely, and in a manner that risks deviation from good 
medicine practices and detraction from the quality of care. [FN48] 
It is highly likely that the genomics revolution will intensify the appeal of AR as a consumer product by 
adding considerably more information at nominal additional cost to services presently rendered. From 
the patient's perspective, imagine being desperate to have a child, [FN49] frustrated and pressured by 
time, worrying to the point of being willing to spend tens of thousands of dollars, perhaps exhausting 
savings and mortgaging a home, and undergoing invasive procedures, all for a thirty to thirty-five 
percent chance of success. [FN50] If extensive multiplex genetic testing for relatively *558 nominal 
additional cost means considerably more information about a pregnancy, even if that information is 
generally hazy at best and of questionable medical utility, the temptation to opt for more information is 
understandable. AR providers could enhance that appeal by packaging the extra information as an 
added value. From the patient's perspective, given the element of desperation associated with most AR 
services, more information about the medical status of embryos and pregnancies is likely to be 
perceived as preferable, especially in light of limited patient-consumer capabilities to meaningfully 
assess and process that information. From an AR provider's perspective, offering patients more medical 
information and, specifically, genetic information [FN51] for a relatively nominal extra cost, even if the 
information is of marginal clinical utility, means more market appeal in the highly competitive 
commercial AR sector--a sector marketing aggressively for patients. [FN52] 
 
III. A Proposal for Public Accountability in AR 
 
The United States' approach to health care--in essence, heavy dependence on the private sectors and no 
universal system to ensure a baseline of care for all--is readily distinguishable among developed 
economies. [FN53] The implications for the roles of payer, provider, and patient are extensive. [FN54] 
Arguably, especially for areas of medicine with relatively profound social, ethical and legal implications, 
the United States' privatized approach sometimes necessitates targeted government regulation to 
ensure collection of information routinely gathered by governments acting as payers and 
comprehensive health care overseers in universal health care systems. [FN55] Presumably this need is 
underscored in highly sensitive areas of medicine that also fall into the extreme range of privatization, 
such as AR in the United States. [FN56] 
*559 Experience with AR elsewhere in the world is extensive enough to, at the very least, provide a 
means for drawing comparisons--comparisons made with appreciation for the distinguishing features of 
the United States' health care system that enable thoughtful questioning about the fundamental role of 
government regulation in AR. Virtually all industrialized nations offer meaningful access to AR but with 
more direct government regulation and comprehensive oversight, even when considerable AR services 
are provided through private health care. [FN57] “Increasingly, countries are attempting to create 
statute-based regulatory schemes that regulate either the entire assisted reproduction technology (ART) 
enterprise or large portions of it.” [FN58] A common denominator is regulation to ensure 
comprehensive screening of donated sperm and ova to protect against HIV and other diseases. [FN59] In 
addition to assurance of public safety and good medical practice, most other industrialized nations 
check the goal of assistance in adult procreation with measures to promote public accountability--for 
example, conclusive AR licensing requirements for all service providers. [FN60] Perhaps most notably, 
from 1982 to 1984 the United Kingdom (U.K.) engaged in public debate and deliberation--which, 
incidentally, expressly recognized the entanglement of human embryonic research and infertility 
services [FN61]--through the work of the Warnock Committee. [FN62] For the next six years, Parliament 
considered the Committee's sixty-four recommendations *560 in deliberations open to the public, and 
these deliberations resulted in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (hereinafter the Act) of 
1990. [FN63] The Act introduced statutory regulations governing donor insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, and embryonic research, and the United Kingdom established the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) to implement it. [FN64] Foremost, the Act requires licensing for all AR 
services to ensure government oversight and public accountability. [FN65] In 2001, Parliament 
broadened the HFEA's enabling legislation to allow research that derives human embryonic stem cells 
(hESC) to explore therapeutic properties. [FN66] 
As an extension of regulating AR for accountability, the United States' industrialized counterparts have 
defined and codified a varied set of principles to govern AR. [FN67] Approaches to AR are intentionally 
value-laden, and as varied as the cultures of the countries themselves. For example, the U.K. has 
adopted a primarily child-oriented perspective. [FN68] The country has placed restrictions on the use of 
AR to protect the interests of the potential child, including checks on parental screening and limitations 
on prospective parents' access to donor information which could impose expectations on children 
created with AR. [FN69] In contrast, Canada's perspective has been primarily parent-oriented. [FN70] 
The country involves the law to protect prospective parents from discrimination based upon family 
status, marital status, or sexual orientation. [FN71] 
Similarly, countries vary immensely in terms of practical access to AR *561 services. [FN72] For example, 
the French have imposed stringent standards on access in favor of heterosexual couples seeking to 
realize a conventional nuclear family structure, but, where those criteria are satisfied, there is 
meaningful access. [FN73] In comparison with France, the U.K. favors physician discretion rather than 
prescribed, rigid standards. [FN74] However, U.K. physicians must and do take funding limitations into 
account, for local health authorities adhere to budgets and generally limit allocation of resources for AR 
services. [FN75] A common denominator among the U.K., France, and Canada is that both public and 
private providers of AR services are directly regulated by, and accountable to, government entities 
through licensing and reporting requirements. [FN76] 
What makes the United States so different--so relatively willing to leave AR to self-regulation by the 
medical profession and largely unrestrained for those with the financial means to procure AR services? 
The United States' position on AR is as value-laden as those of its industrialized counterparts, and 
several sociocultural influences are responsible for the United States' unique level of acceptance of AR. 
The United States' approach is multifaceted and shaped largely by a trilogy of deferences. The approach 
encompasses the parent perspective through high deference to human reproduction, and then adds 
additional dimensions of deference to patient-doctor decision making and physicians' discretion to 
practice medicine. 
For more than a quarter of a century, United States jurisprudence has recognized and protected 
procreative liberty expansive enough to encompass decisions to terminate pregnancies for any reason 
prior to viability of the fetus. [FN77] Today, in spite of anxiety over research that destroys embryos and 
use of cloning in human reproduction, [FN78] procreation, with or without AR, generally is embraced 
and largely shielded from the intrusion of law to the point of making government accounting and public 
accountability dependent *562 upon voluntary reporting. [FN79] As observed by Professor Robertson: 
It is not surprising that an interlocking set of laws, norms and practices exist that support reproduction. 
Deeply engrained social attitudes and practices celebrate the importance of family and children. Laws, 
ethical norms, and institutions protect and support human desires to have or avoid having offspring, and 
the rearing that follows. The deep psychological commitment one has to the well-being of one's 
offspring is reflected in the strong family and constitutional law protections for rearing rights and duties 
in biologic offspring, in special tort damages for the loss of children and parents, in the law of rape, in 
the rise of an infertility industry, and in the wide acceptance of prenatal screening programs for the 
health of offspring . . . . Strong protection of procreative liberty and family autonomy in rearing offspring 
is yet another way that social recognition of the importance of reproduction is shown. [FN80] 
In addition to this psychological, social, and, as many argue, biological drive to embrace human 
reproduction, [FN81] the United States also has a rich legacy of deferring to individual doctor-patient 
relationships [FN82] and to doctors' discretion to practice medicine. [FN83] Limitations on the FDA's 
authority, both under law [FN84] and through FDA self-restraint, [FN85] underscore deference to the 
medical profession. [FN86] These deferences under the law--*563 deference to reproduction, doctor-
patient decision making, and the discretion to practice medicine without government intrusion-- 
intersect in AR. 
Eric Parens, Lori Knowles, and others have emphasized an association between United States oversight 
of reproductive medicine and the dynamics of the abortion debate. [FN87] According to Parens and 
Knowles, “[t]hose dynamics make policymakers reluctant to engage in a decision about embryo 
research.” [FN88] In fact, the more fundamental trilogy of deferences identified above are encompassed 
in the United States abortion debate and arguably drive Justice Blackmun's Roe v. Wade opinion. [FN89] 
These deferences also transcend the abortion debate and link acceptance of ART with both proponents 
and opponents of a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Opponents of abortion center on 
deference towards reproduction, while proponents advocate individual choice in reproduction, patient-
doctor decision making, and the discretion to practice medicine. 
Lori Knowles also attributes the United States' warm embrace of ART to “an embedded tradition of 
commercialization.” [FN90] According to Professor Knowles: 
This [influence] applies to many realms of human reproduction, from sales of ova and commercial 
surrogacy, to sales of gender selection technologies and parental DNA testing. Restrictions on 
commercialization in the United States are viewed with suspicion as is much government regulation. 
Current government restrictions on funding of hESC research continue to be controversial. [FN91] 
While faith in market forces and suspicion of government certainly distinguish the United States from 
Canada and many European counterparts, the United States is becoming increasingly questioning of 
commercial incentives in the context of the delivery of health care, especially with the proliferation of 
managed care. [FN92] In fact, managed care and excessive commercialization in the health context, 
from the delivery of care to the marketing of pharmaceuticals, is pushing the United States into an era 
of consumer-driven medicine. [FN93] Moreover, in biotechnology R&D, where *564 commercialization 
has been most embraced in the context of health care, the United States government has been directly 
and extensively involved. From the Human Genome Project to the tens of billions of dollars invested in 
basic research annually through the National Institutes of Health, the United States government has 
been a presence welcomed by academia, industry, patient groups, and the general public. And from the 
Federal Technology Transfer Policy introduced in the 1980s to the dramatic expansion of the FDA 
through user fees in the 1990s, extensive government regulation has been accepted as the means to 
advance the genomics revolution. [FN94] The trilogy of deferences has shielded ART from more 
extensive government regulation in spite of the norms of a looming government presence in biomedical 
R&D and increasing public discomfort with and suspicion of the commercial sectors in health care. 
Proponents of continued reliance on voluntary reporting and self-regulation in AR assert that this 
approach is working, that AR is effectively regulated, and that more extensive direct government 
regulation of AR would invite intrusion. [FN95] For example, they caution that more direct government 
involvement in AR could welcome the codification of subjective values that many of our industrialized 
counterparts have engaged in--for example, to favor heterosexual couples seeking to realize a 
conventional nuclear family structure while discouraging others. [FN96] This is a valid concern, but the 
value our society places on family, and the trilogy of deferences that have proven so influential in the 
United States' approach to AR regulation thus far suggest the opposite. Rather, as observed by Professor 
Robertson, our society probably will grow even more comfortable with AR over time with increasing 
familiarity and expansion of clinical capabilities, especially if there are reliable assurances of good 
medicine practices and accountability along the way. [FN97] 
The distinguishing features of AR as a field of medicine deserve attention, [FN98] as recognized in a 
March 2004 report issued by the President's Council on Bioethics, entitled Reproduction and 
Responsibility: The Regulation of New Biotechnologies. [FN99] The increase of more direct, reliable 
government regulation of AR in the United States would, of course, have to *565 be implemented in a 
constitutionally sound manner, meaning in a way consistent with recognized rights such as procreative 
liberty [FN100] and commercial free speech. [FN101] Any expansion of the role of the FDA could not 
transcend checks on the agency's authority that protect the physician's discretion to practice medicine. 
[FN102] 
An approach proposed by Professors Lori Andrews, Nanette Elster, and others is regulation to raise the 
quality of consumer information about AR, thereby heightening consumer awareness and meaningful 
choice. [FN103] States may require physicians to provide information about alternatives to abortion and 
make women wait days after the delivery of such information before exercising their decision to 
terminate a pregnancy, as held by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. [FN104] The 
ability to require the delivery of sound medical information about AR services should fit cleanly within 
states' discretion. [FN105] Nevertheless, given the regional, national, and significant international scope 
of the markets for AR services and the Internet access to those markets that is being exercised by 
service providers *566 and patients, a baseline of more meaningful federal oversight is preferable. 
[FN106] Any United States federal regulatory approach will have to embody sensitivity to governing 
values in the United States--the deferences influencing current law and policy [FN107]--and comply with 
constitutional and other restrictions on government involvement. Accordingly, the United States should 
adopt a regulatory approach to AR centered on assurance of good medicine and, to the extent possible, 
build upon existing regulatory schemes, such as federal oversight of commercial laboratories under the 
Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amendments (CLIA). [FN108] 
At the very least, the United States should join its industrialized counterparts and adopt a 
comprehensive, national licensing requirement for all AR services that is an extension of the CDC's 
model program [FN109] and that draws from the certification of clinical laboratory services under CLIA. 
[FN110] As so many other nations have done, and as has been suggested by Erik Parens, Lori Knowles, 
and others, the United States should draw from the United Kingdom experience, albeit with focus on 
United States law and policy, and work with the driving trilogy of deferences. [FN111] Responsive to the 
sensitivities of AR, the United States should establish a committed overseeing authority modeled as a 
counterpart to--not a substitute for--the Office of Human Research Protection, which centralizes 
oversight of implementation of human research protections in the United States. [FN112] In crafting this 
body, the United States also should draw from the HFEA in England and the Reproductive Technology 
Accreditation Committee (RTAC) in Australia. [FN113] Unlike the HFEA, and in spite of the inevitable 
practical entanglement of AR and human embryonic stem cell research (HESCR), this body should be 
focused on AR to avoid commingling the often competing goals of advancing research and patient care, 
though their innate entanglement must be constantly recognized and addressed. [FN114] 
*567 This approach is responsive to a governing theme of Reproduction and Responsibility. [FN115] 
While the Council made some recommendations for studies and data collection, self-regulation by 
professional societies, and targeted legislative measures, the overall theme of the report is that there 
simply is too much unknown about AR to undertake significant regulatory reform at this time. [FN116] 
According to the Council, “[w]ithout the answers to such questions, it would be premature at best to 
recommend dramatic legal or institutional changes. Further research and inquiry, and additional 
consultations with all those affected, are clearly needed.” [FN117] An alternative conclusion is that, 
given the maturity of the AR sector over the last several years and the distinguishing features of AR, it is 
irresponsible for the United States government to further delay regulatory reform necessary to ensure 
reliable accountability and awareness of what is transpiring in AR in the United States while tens of 
thousands of people use AR services on an annual basis. [FN118] Reforms such as those proposed in this 
article should be undertaken to move the United States closer to a position of awareness, 
accountability, and reliable oversight in AR. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Deference to human reproduction, to physician discretion to practice medicine, and to physician-patient 
decision-making have limited direct government regulation of AR in the United States, resulting in 
considerable reliance upon self-regulation by those providing AR services. [FN119] This article has 
identified features of AR that support meaningful direct government *568 regulation. [FN120] The 
present lack of information about AR recognized by the President's Council on Bioethics is unacceptable, 
[FN121] especially given the expansive growth of AR over the last several years, the predictability of that 
growth years before, and the measures to ensure accountability undertaken by the United States' 
industrialized counterparts, such as the United Kingdom's adoption of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act a decade and one-half ago. [FN122] 
The United States should join its industrialized counterparts and adopt a comprehensive, national 
licensing requirement for all AR services that is an extension of the CDC's Model Program [FN123] and 
which draws from the certification of clinical laboratory services under CLIA. [FN124] Reliable 
government oversight and full awareness of what is transpiring in AR is a baseline that must be 
established now, for the reproduction and genomics revolutions are raging, intensifying, and integrating. 
The trilogy of deferences must give way to accountability and assurance of good medicine in the clinical 
practice of AR. 
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